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Statutory and Common Law Repairmen's Liens in
Illinois Under Section 9-310 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
A repairman's lien' is a security interest in a chattel for the value
of services and materials supplied. Such liens commonly arise in the
context of automobile repairs. However, these liens will encompass
an increasing number and variety of transactions as machines re-
quiring long-term maintenance proliferate.
At common law the lien entitled the repairman to possess the
chattel until his bill was paid. The existence of the lien depended
solely on continued possession. Most states have added statutory
foreclosure and sale remedies, and some have notice and filing pro-
visions, as well. Both common law and statute govern repairmen's
liens in Illinois.2 The distinction between common law and statutory
liens implicates special problems created by the operation of section
9-310 of the Uniform Commercial Code,3 which controls priority
between the repairman and a prior-perfected secured party.,
The United States Supreme Court has enunciated some due pro-
cess guidelines in the area of creditors' prejudgment remedies.' Be-
cause repairmen's liens, as one such remedy, must comply with
these guidelines, they have come under judicial scrutiny.' Insofar as
the Illinois repairmen's lien acts were drafted before the Supreme
Court decisions, they must be examined to see whether they are in
accord with due process requirements.
This article will consider Illinois repairmen's lien statutes to de-
termine: (1) the effect of 9-310 on priority between repairmen's liens
and prior-perfected security interests, and (2) the constitutionality
of their enforcement procedures.
1. This term is used because it reflects the usual relationship and activity involved, in
these kinds of liens. They are also called artisans' liens, garagemen's liens, and, incorrectly,
mechanic's liens. Mechanic's liens refer to work done on real property. BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1072 (4th ed. 1968).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 40-47; id. ch. 82, §§ 47a-47f (1975). See National Bank of
Joliet v. Bergeron Cadillac, Inc., 38 Il1. App. 3d 598, 347 N.E.2d 874 (4th Dist. 1976).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-310 (1975); the Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter
be referred to as UCC or Code.
4. See notes 24 through 39 infra and accompanying text.
5. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
6. Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974); Caeser v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645
(M.D.N.C. 1975); Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 386 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Cockerel v.
Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.
1973); Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W.Va. 1973).
Repairmen's Liens
THE RULE OF PRIORITY IN SECTION 9-310
With the exception of 9-310, article nine of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code does not deal with liens. Section 9-310 states a simple rule
for determining priority between a lien for materials and services
and a security interest in the same chattel:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security
interest, a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given
by statute or rule of law for such materials or services takes priority
over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory and
the statute expressly provides otherwise.'
This section applies only to possessory liens; liens that rely on notice
and filing requirements are outside its purview.' Section 9-310 oper-
ates to give these possessory liens priority over other security inter-
ests in all situations save one. This exception occurs when the pos-
sessory lien is statutory and a provision expressly states that prefer-
ence be given to the security interest. Thus, liens based on common
law or on statutes silent as to priorities take over prior-perfected
security interests.'
The drafters of the UCC adopted a uniform rule of priority in
order to minimize the differences among the states' various lien
statutes.' This rule reverses the pre-Code scheme of priority in
many states, including Illinois." It also works a major exception to
the general rule of article nine that first to perfect obtains priority.
If two conditions are met-the goods or services are furnished in the
ordinary course of business and the lienor retains possession of the
chattel' 2-a lien that arises without notice'3 can defeat a prior-
perfected security interest in the same chattel.'4 By requiring refer-
ence to the various states' statutory lien provisions for priority, sec-
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-310 (1975).
8. Illinois Code Comment to 9-310, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-310 (Smith-Hurd 1974).
9. G. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-310: 3 (2d ed. 1971).
10. Miller, Liens Created by Operation of Law: A Look at Section 9-310 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 76 COM. L.J. 221, 224 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
11. See Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 11. 467, 143 N.E. 61 (1924); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Allen, 52 111. App. 2d 114, 201 N.E.2d 747 (1st Dist. 1964). The decisions from other
states are collected in two A.L.R. Annotations: Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 198 (1953); Annot., 36
A.L.R.2d 229 (1953). Gilmore gives a partial list of cases after 1953, 2 G. GILMORE, SECuRrrY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 33.3, at 876 n.1 (1965).
12. See note 8 supra.
13. Such as a common law lien.
14. Miller, supra note 10, at 224. Because of the perceived threat that these liens pose to
Code priorities and uniformity, Miller would restrict the benefit of § 9-310 to those liens which
encourage artisans to improve goods and thus increase their value for owners and holders of
secured interests.
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tion 9-310 permits non-uniformity among the states. 5 Moreover, it
can produce varying results within a single state with many lien
statutes, such as Illinois."
The official comments to 9-310 indicate that the basis for the
repairman's priority resides in his enhancement or preservation of
the value of the collateral.' 7 Allowing the creditor to claim improved
property at the expense of the repairman's interest would grant the
creditor an unfair windfall. However, the typical repairs made on
an automobile neither enhance nor preserve the value of the collat-
eral. Frequently, repair bills exceed the value of the property."
Thus, from a practical standpoint the basis for the repairman's
priority is weak.
Balanced against this conceptual support for the repairman are
arguments that favor the secured party. The security interest ordi-
narily precedes the lien, and one rationale for giving priority to that
interest is "first in time, first in right." Illinois courts, among
others, have held that the secured party has a property interest that
should not be defeated or diluted without his consent."' Because
security interests are usually recorded, the repairman has construc-
tive notice of the prior interest, and thus is in a position to protect
himself.
THE EFFECT OF 9-310 IN ILLINOIS
The basic Illinois statutory lien for repairs and storage' author-
15. Id. at 228.
16. See notes 42 through 44 infra and accompanying text.
17. See UCC Comment 1 to 9-310.
18. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 33.3, at 878 (1965); Note,
Priorities Between Article Nine Security Interests and Statutory Liens in Iowa, 23 Drake L.
Rev. 169, 171 (1973).
19. GILMORE, supra note 18, at 876.
20. Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467, 143 N.E. 61 (1924).
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 40-47 (1975), which provide as follows:
§ 40. Every person, firm or corporation who has expended labor, skill or mate-
rials upon any chattel, or has furnished storage for said chattel, at the request of
its owner, reputed owner, or authorized agent of the owner, or lawful possessor
thereof, shall have a lien upon such chattel beginning on the date of the commence-
ment of such expenditure of labor, skill and materials or of such storage for the
contract price for all such expenditure of labor, skill or materials, or for all such
storage, or in the absence of such contract price, for the reasonable worth of such
expenditure of labor, skill and materials, or of such storage, for a period of one year
from and after the completion of such expenditure of labor, skill or materials, or of
such storage, notwithstanding the fact that the possession of such chattel has been
surrendered to the owner, or lawful possessor thereof.
§ 41. Such lien shall cease at the expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of
the delivery of such chattel to the owner thereof, or his duly authorized agent,
unless the lien claimant shall within said sixty (60) days, file in the office of the
[Vol. 8
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recorder of deeds of the county in which said labor, skill and materials were ex-
pended on such chattel, or storage furnished for such chattel, a lien notice, which
notice shall state the name of the claimant, the name of the owner or reputed owner,
a description of the chattel, sufficient for identification, upon which the claimant
has expended labor, skill and material, or has furnished storage, the amount for
which the lien is claimed, and the date upon which such expenditure or storage was
completed, which notice shall be verified by the oath of the claimant, or by some
one in his behalf, having personal knowledge of the facts, and may be in substan-
tially the following form:
......... Claimant, v ............. Defendant.
Notice is hereby given that ..................... claims a lien upon
......... .(describe the property) for, and on account of labor, skill, and
materials expended upon, and storage furnished for the .......... (property);
that the name of the owner or reputed owner, is ............. that the said
labor, skill and mterials were expended, or storage furnished upon the said
property between the ....... .day of ........... and the ...........
day of rendition of the labor, skill and materials so expended, or storage furnished
by the claimant above named was completed on the ............... day of
.......... ; that sixty days have not elapsed since that time; that the amount
claimant demands for said labor, skill and materials so expended, or storage fur-
nished, is $ ......... ; that no part thereof has been paid except $ ........ ;
and that there is now due and remaining unpaid thereon, after deducting all just
credits and offsets, the sum of $ .......... in which amount he claims a lien upon
said property.
(Signed) ........................
Claimant
Address of Claimant .................
State of Illinois,
County of .........
SS.
I ................... being first duly sworn, on oath say that I am
............ .named in the foregoing claim; that I have heard the same
read, and know the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ...... .day of ...........
§ 42. Upon presentation of such notice to the recorder of deeds of any county,
it shall be the duty of the said recorder of deeds to file the same in his office and to
index the same in a book to be kept by him for that purpose and called "index of
liens upon chattels". The recorder of deeds shall be entitled to charge and receive
from the person filing such a notice of lien a fee of $5.
§ 43. The lien created by this Act shall be subject to the lien of any bona fide
security interest as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, upon the same chat-
tel recorded prior to the commencement of any lien herein created, but the lien
herein created shall be in addition to, and shall not exclude, any lien now existing
at common law, and any lien existing by virtue of "An Act concerning liens for
labor, services, skill, or materials expended upon chattels,", filed July 24, 1941.
§ 44. Any lien provided for in this Act may be released and discharged by the
lien claimant, or his agent, filing with the recorder of deeds a satisfaction piece,
which shall be acknowledged in the same manner as provided by law for the ac-
knowledgment of deeds, which shall also be indexed in the "index of liens upon
chattels". The owner of said chattel may also file witb the recorder of deeds any
written document which would show or tend to show the non-existence, satisfac-
tion, or termination of such lien which written document shall also be indexed in
the "index of lien upon chattels".
The fee for filing any document under the provisions of this section shall be one
dollar and the fee for furnishing a certified copy of any document filed with the
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recorder of deeds under the provisions of this Act shall be the same fee received by
him for furnishing certified copies of recorded instruments.
§ 45. Liens provided for in this Act may be foreclosed by suit in chancery in
the Circuit Court of any county in the State of Illinois, or they may be foreclosed
by advertisement and sale of the chattel, subject to the lien, in the following man-
ner: That the person, or claimant, desiring to foreclose such lien by advertisement
and sale, shall deliver to the sheriff of the county in which such chattel is then
situated, a certified copy of the notice of lien duly certified to by the recorder of
deeds where the same was filed, with the request endorsed thereon, signed by the
claimant, or his attorney, for the foreclosure of said lien. Thereupon said sheriff,
upon the claimant giving to him a bond as in cases of replevin, shall take the
property described in said notice of lien into his possession, and for such purpose
shall have power to enter any building, garage or other inclosure where the same
may be stored or held, in the same manner as provided by law under a writ of
replevin, and shall at the time of such taking, deliver to the person having posses-
sion of such chattel, if such chattel is found in the possession of any person, and
mail postage prepaid to the owner or reputed owner and to any mortgagee or his
assignee if known, having a duly recorded unpaid chattel mortgage upon the chattel
described in such lien, a copy of said lien notice, certified to by the lien claimant
or his attorney, together with an itemized bill of particulars of the said lien claim-
ant's demand, also certified to by such lien claimant or his attorneys; the person
or persons claiming to own or to have an interest in the said property, may at any
time within ten days after such service and mailing of notice herein provided for,
deliver to the sheriff a written and verified denial of any allegation contained in
said lien notice or bill of particulars, and if such denial or any allegation of payment
on the part of any such person, or persons, be so made and served upon the officer
then in possession of said chattel, such officer shall then and in such case retain
the possession of said personal property, subject only to the order or orders of the
Circuit Court having jurisdiction of the parties, or the subject matter, in a foreclo-
sure suit to be prosecuted by such lien claimant, which foreclosure suit shall be
begun and prosecuted within an additional period of ten days from the time of
service upon such officer of such denial or allegation of payment. In such case, if
the lien claimant shall fail to commence and prosecute such foreclosure suit within
such period of ten days, the sheriff shall release the said personal property from
such levy and deliver the same to the person or persons having, or claiming, an
interest therein. If such suit be commenced within said period of ten days, the
sheriff shall retain the property in his possession subject to the final judgment or
decree of the court in such suit. If the person claiming to own said personal prop-
erty, or to have an interest therein, or someone in his behalf, shall not, within the
period of ten days herein provided for, make a written denial of any allegation
contained in said lien notice or bill of particulars, or allege full or partial payment
of the sum demanded by lien claimant, the said sheriff shall advertise the said
property for sale in the manner provided by law for the sale of personal property
on execution, for a period of not less than ten days, and after giving such notice of
sale, shall sell such chattel at public auction to the highest bidder for cash, to
satisfy such lien, accrued interest, costs of seizure and filing and recording such lien
and certified copies thereof, and storage; and the proceeds derived from such sale
shall be applied to the payment of costs as herein provided, and the amount of such
lien and accrued interest in the order named, and the overplus, if any there be, shall
be paid to the owner of such chattel; provided, that any person claiming to own or
to have an interest in the said personal property, shall, after making such denial of
any material allegation in the lien notice or bill of particulars, or alleging payment
in whole or in part of the lien claimed, make, execute and cause to be delivered to
the sheriff then having the possession of such chattel, a good and sufficient under-
taking executed by one or more sufficient sureties in the sum of not less than one
hundred dollars ($100.00), and equal to double the amount of the lien claimed,
undertaking to redeliver such chattel in like order and condition as it was when
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izes a 1-year lien for services rendered, materials furnished, or chat-
tels stored. The year begins upon completion of the rendered serv-
ices. Once the lienor gives up possession of the chattel, he has 60
days to file a lien notice with the recorder of deeds in order to
preserve his right. Though the statute allows a repairman to retain
possession, record his lien, and foreclose, it encourages relinquish-
ment of the chattel. 2 This result is desirable in light of the impor-
tance the Supreme Court has attached to the owner's interest in
the continued possession and use of his chattel.23
Since this Illinois statutory lien is basically non-possessory, it is
not controlled by the rule of priority in 9-310, at least in situations
where the repairman has given up possession. However, the statute
provides its own rule of priority. Section 43 states that a repairman's
seized, to the sheriff upon demand of such officer having an execution issued upon
any judgment, or in lieu thereof to pay to the lien claimant any judgment which
such lien claimant, or his personal representative or assigns may recover against
the defendant, or defendants, in any forclosure suit that may be brought to foreclose
such lien within the period above mentioned, and further conditioned in said bond,
any attorney of any court of record, shall thereby be authorized irrevocably to
appear for said principal or surety, jointly or severally at any time thereafter, and
enter the appearance of said principal or surety in any foreclosure suit relating to
said property, then pending or thereafter to be commenced, without process, as a
party defendant, then such sheriff shall deliver such personal property to such
person, or persons, executing said undertaking. Such sheriff shall pass upon the
sufficiency of such undertaking and the sureties thereon; providing, that the Circuit
Court having jurisdiction in any foreclosure suit shall at the time of rendering
judgment and decree of foreclosure, make and enter an alternative decree directing
the principal and surety to forthwith surrender said chattel to the sheriff to be dealt
with in accordance with the terms of said decree or in lieu thereof, to pay to the
lien claimant the amount of said judgment; and provided further, that said judg-
ment shall thereupon be entered and docketed against said principal and surety;
provided, further, that any defendant may, in lieu of the bond of surety above
provided for, deposit with the sheriff a sum of money equal to the amount of
claimant's lien, together with an additional sum of ($50.00) fifty dollars, said mon-
eys to be held in lieu of such bond and from which sums claimant's judgment may
be paid after execution issued.
§ 46. In all cases where suit is brought in the Circuit Court of any county in
the State of Illinois for the purpose of foreclosing the lien herein provided, the court
shall, upon entering judgment for the complainant, allow as a part of the costs in
said suit all moneys paid, if any, for the foreclosure by advertisement and sale of
the chattel under section 6 of this Act, together with the costs of filing and recording
such lien and certified copies thereof.
§ 47. The invalidity of any section or sections of this Act shall not affect the
validity of the remainder of this Act. If for any reason section 6 of this Act shall be
held to be invalid, the liens provided for in this Act may be foreclosed by bill in
equity in the Circuit Court of any county in the State of Illinois having jurisdiction
of the persons or the subject matter.
22. This is primarily a non-possessory lien.
23. See notes 48 through 70 infra and accompanying text.
24. Illinois Code Comment to 9-310, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, § 9-310 (Smith-Hurd 1974).
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lien is subject to another lien upon the same chattel of any bona fide
security interest as defined in the UCC, so long as that security
interest was recorded prior to the commencement of the repairman's
lien.25 Therefore, because of this express statutory provision, the
secured party will have priority even if the repairman retains posses-
sion of the chattel.
Section 9-310 insures that the repairman's lien will prevail if the
state statute does not explicitly give preference to the secured party.
Before the Illinois legislature amended section 43, the interaction of
that provision and 9-310 could engender an anomalous result. In
Westlake Finance Co. v. Spearmon,26 for example, the application
of 9-310 to the language of the unamended section 43 reversed the
judicial principles reflected in pre-Code decisions. Section 43 had
the words "chattel mortgage" instead of "bona fide security inter-
est" as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code." Plaintiff, holder
of a conditional sales contract interest in an automobile, instituted
an action of replevin when the owner defaulted on payments. The
car was taken from the possession of the defendant repairman, who
immediately filed his lien notice after the sheriff replevied the car.
Because the language in section 43 mentioned only chattel
mortgages, and not conditional sales contracts, the appellate court
was compelled by 9-310 to give priority to the repairman's lien. Case
law prior to the adoption of the UCC had interpreted the language
of section 43 to include conditional sales contracts,"8 but because it
was not expressly stated, priority could not be given under 9-310.
By broadening the statute to include all bona fide security inter-
ests, the legislature demonstrated that it intended to follow the
policy of giving priority to prior-perfected security interests. Never-
theless, during the amendment process the legislature seems to have
overlooked other language in section 43 that thwarts its intent. The
neglected language concerns common law repairmen's liens.29
THE Co-EXISTENT COMMON LAW LIEN
Section 43 states that the lien created by the statute "shall be in
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 43 (1975).
26. 64 Ill. App. 2d 342, 213 N.E.2d 80 (1st Dist. 1965). When this case was decided, the
amendment was already in effect, but the conflict had arisen under the prior language.
27. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, § 43 (1963).
28. Motor Acceptance, Inc. v. Newton, 262 Ill. App. 335 (4th Dist. 1931).
29. This result was not apparent unless one was familiar with the effect of 9-310. It was
not until 6 years after the enactment of 9-310 that a common law lien was asserted in this
situation. Pennington v. Alexander, 103 Ill. App. 2d 145, 242 N.E.2d 788 (5th Dist. 1968).
Unfortunately for the plaintiff repairman, he failed to assert the common law lien at trial, so
the court refused to consider the matter at the appellate level.
[Vol. 8
Repairmen's Liens
addition to, and shall not exclude, any lien now existing at common
law. . "30 This language allows a common law artisan's lien to co-
exist with its statutory counterpart.3 At common law an artisan
who, with the owner's approval, enhanced or repaired a chattel
through the expenditure of his labor and materials was entitled to
retain possession of the chattel until his bill was paid. Foreclosure
and sale provisions are statutory additions that were unknown at
common law. The common law lien is thus limited to the right to
retain possession, nothing more.
The standard interpretation of 9-310 gives a common law lien
priority over another security interest. 2 This interpretation, coupled
with the language in section 43, allowed the appellate court in
National Bank of Joliet v. Bergeron Cadillac, Inc. 33 to conclude that
a repairman who retained possession of an automobile and asserted
a common law lien was to be given priority over the holder of a prior-
perfected security interest. The repairman's common law interest,
the right to retain possession, was sufficient to defeat an action of
replevin brought by the secured party.
Although the court did not allude to it, this decision was made
possible by the language in section 43 authorizing a co-existent
common law lien. 4 While the Illinois Code Comment to 9-310 indi-
cates the same result, 5 Judge Craven, in a dissenting opinion, criti-
cized this outcome by observing that the Illinois lien statute sought
to establish an exclusive statutory scheme that eliminated common
law liens. Although the language of the statute does not support
his position, a consideration of policy and the practical problems
raised by this result does.
The Bergeron Cadillac holding puts a repairman who complies
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 43 (1975).
31. The predecessor of sections 40-47, the Garage Keeper's Lien Act of 1917, was held "not
declaratory of a common law lien. . ."in Jensen v. Wilcox Lumber Co., 295 Ill. 294, 297,
129 N.E. 133, 135 (1920).
32. See note 9 supra.
33. 38 11. App. 3d 598, 347 N.E.2d 874 (4th Dist. 1976).
34. The court based its decision chiefly on an assertion of a well-established common law
lien in Illinois, although its cited precedent was not overwhelming, as pointed out in Judge
Craven's dissent. 38 Ill. App. 3d at 602, 347 N.E.2d at 878.
35. The Illinois Code Comments discussed the fact situations of Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311
11. 467, 143 N.E. 61 (1924) and The Nathan M. Stone Co. v. Ellerson, 230 11. App. 593 (1st
Dist. 1923), in which subsequent possessory repairmen's liens had been asserted against
chattels that were subject to a prior chattel mortgage. The courts had refused to give priority
to the repairmen. The Comments concluded:
To the extent that a possessory lien may be found to rest on a common law basis
in the circumstances of these cases under the Code, this section would establish a
rule contrary to these two decisions and others to the same effect.
36. 38 Ill. App. 3d at 602, 347 N.E.2d at 878.
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with section 40 in a worse position than one who merely retains
possession. 7 The ability to withhold possession of a chattel can be
a powerful bargaining force in obtaining payment. For instance, an
automobile is vital to many people. Possession of it may induce
payment as effectively as threat of sale. It can be expected that
repairmen will assert a common law lien in order to gain the benefit
of priority over the secured party, even though they must sacrifice
the remedy of foreclosure and sale. 8 Section 40 offers a compromise
by protecting the interest of the repairman through registration and
sale while allowing the owner to quickly regain possession of the
chattel. A court that enforces the repairman's common law right to
retain possession undermines this statutory compromise and im-
pairs the efficacy of the statute.
In amending the language of section 43, the legislature expressed
an intent to give priority to security interests over repairmen's
liens.39 Moreover, although the common law lien is limited to posses-
sion, it can prevent the secured creditor from taking action to satisfy
the owner's obligation upon default. Since the repairman's common
law lien defeats an action for replevin, the creditor has limited op-
tions until the repairman is paid. Consequently, it is evident that,
in amending section 43, the legislature found the will, but not the
way.
EFFECT OF 9-310 ON THE ILLINOIS MECHANIC'S SMALL LIEN ACT
The Bergeron Cadillac court mentioned another method of assert-
ing a lien for materials and services in Illinois: the Mechanic's Small
Lien Act.4" This lien is limited to claims of $200 or less. The Act
37. Id.
38. The court indicated uncertainty as to what would occur if the repairman claiming a
common law lien subsequently wished to move for foreclosure and sale. It would seem clear
that in order to avoid semantic fiction, the lienor who wishes to sell would have to proceed
under sections 40-47, and thereby give up his priority.
39. See notes 27 through 29 supra and accompanying text.
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 47a-47f (1975):
§ 47a. Every person expending labor, services, skill or material upon or furnish-
ing storage for any chattel at the request of its owner, authorized agent of the owner,
or lawful possessor thereof, in the amount of $200 or less, shall have a lien upon
such chattel beginning upon the date of commencement of such expenditure of
labor, services, skill, or materials or furnishing of storage, for the contract price for
all such expenditure of labor, services, skill, or material, until the possession of such
chattel is voluntarily relinquished to such owner or authorized agent, or to one
entitled to the possession thereof.
§ 47b. Unless the chattel is redeemed within 90 days of the completion of the
expenditure of such labor, services, skill, or material or furnishing of storage, or
within 90 days of the date agreed upon for redemption, the lien may be enforced
by a public sale as hereinafter provided.
[Vol. 8
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authorizes a repairman to retain possession of the chattel and, un-
less it is redeemed within 90 days of the completion of services, to
sell it at public sale.4' Because the Act does not expressly provide
for the priority of security interests, 9-310 operates to give the lienor
preference.42 Thus, the amount of the claim determines whether the
§ 47c. Such sale shall be held only after giving 10 days' notice of the time and
place of such sale, by publication once in some newspaper of general circulation in
the city, village, or incorporated town in which such lienor expended such labor,
services, skill, or material or furnished such storage, or if there be none, or if the
labor, service, skill or material was not expended in a city, village, or incorporated
town, then in some newspaper of general circulation in the county in which such
lienor expended such labor, service, skill, or material or furnished such storage, and
also by mailing, 10 days before such sale, a copy of such notice addressed to the
person requesting such expenditure of labor, services, skill, or material or furnishing
of storage, if his address is known, or if his address is unknown, to the last known
address of such person. If no address is known or discoverable after reasonable
inquiry, the sale may be made without mailing such notice. The published notice
required by this Section shall be in substantially the following form:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN
That on (insert date), a sale will be held at (insert place), to sell the following
articles to enforce a lien existing under the laws of the State of Illinois against such
articles for labor, services, skill or material expended upon a storage furnished for
such articles at the request of the following designated persons, unless such articles
are redeemed within ten days of the publication of this notice.
Name of Person Description of Article Amount of lien
. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A separate notice need not be published for each lien to be enforced, but several
may be combined in one publication.
47d. If the chattel or chattels are not redeemed within 10 days after the publica-
tion of the notice required by Section 3 of this Act, 1 the lienor may sell such articles
at public auction on the day and at the place specified in such notice. The proceeds
of the sale in excess of the charges for the expenditure of such labor, services, skill,
or material or furnishing of storage, and the necessary expenses of the procedure
required by this Act, shall be held by the lienor for a period of 6 months, and if not
reclaimed by the owner thereof within that time shall be deposited with the county
treasurer of the county in which such labor, services, skill or materials were ex-
pended or such storage was furnished. The said treasurer shall credit such excess
to the general revenue fund of the county, subject to the right of the owner or his
representatives to reclaim the same at any time within 3 years of the date of such
deposit with the treasurer.
47e. Conformity to the requirements of this Act shall be a perpetual bar to any
action against such lienor by any person for the recovery of such chattels or of the
value thereof, or of any damages growing out of the failure of such person to receive
such chattels.
§ 47f. The purpose and intent of this Act is to provide an inexpensive means of
enforcing liens for small amounts, and to that end the provisions of this Act shall
be construed to create a lien in addition to, and shall not exclude, any lien which
may exist by virtue of either the common law or any other statute of the State of
Illinois.
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 47a-47b (1975).
42. See note 9 supra.
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repairman has priority over the secured party. For instance, a re-
pairman retains possession of a chattel after he has completed his
services. If his bill is over $200, he can assert a lien under section
40. His lien will be subject to any prior-perfected security interests
in the chattel under section 43. However, if in the same situation
the claim were under $200, the repairman could assert his lien under
this Act and obtain priority over a secured party.
The purpose of the Mechanic's Small Lien Act is to allow expedi-
ent, inexpensive means of enforcing small claims.43 Yet, it is un-
likely that the legislature intended to give special preference to
small liens when large claims are not afforded the same shelter from
security interests. One could argue that small liens need special
treatment because of their size.44 But a more convincing explanation
would be that insofar as the statute was drafted when the prevailing
case law gave priority to security interests, there was no reason to
include a separate provision on priority.45 Former case law that con-
strued silent statutes to give priority to the secured party is not
relevant to the operation of 9-310.41 This illustrates a major flaw in
the effect of 9-310; it can react to pre-Code wording or silent statutes
by producing a result contrary to the former scheme of priority
within a state. For this reason, if the legislature is to make a con-
scious choice as to the priority it wishes each lien to enjoy, it should
review current lien statutes in light of the results produced by 9-310.
A clear statement of legislative policy would be preferable to prior-
ity by happenstance.
If the legislature wishes the repairman to enjoy his preferred
status under the Mechanic's Small Lien Act, then it should consider
what title would be passed by a sale under this statute.47 Because
no provision is made to reissue title upon sale, the buyer would take
a title upon which there is a bona fide security interest outstanding.
43. Leavitt v. Charles R. Hearn, Inc., 19 111. App. 3d 980, 312 N.E.2d 806 (lst Dist. 1974).
44. Gilmore has noted that many courts desire to protect the repairman because he i§ a
small businessman, not usually conversant with the laws. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 881-82.
By the same token, smaller claims may be in need of more protection by the state in order
that they may be enforced at all. If this is the desired policy, then the legislature should make
it clear.
45. See note 11 supra.
46. UCC Comment 2 to 9-310, which provides in part:
If the statute creating the lien is silent, even though it has been construed by
decision to make the lien subordinate to the security interest, this section provides
a rule of interpretation that the lien should take priority over the security interest.
47. The court in National Bank of Joliet v. Bergeron Cadillac, Inc., 38 Ill. App. 3d 598,
347 N.E.2d 874 (4th Dist. 1976), raised this point without expressing any opinion. 38 Ill. App.
3d at 600, 347 N.E.2d at 876.
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This would discourage rapid sale of the chattel and would jeopardize
use of the Act as an efficient means of settling small claims.
DUE PROCESS STANDARDS FOR REPAIRMEN'S LIENS
The Supreme Court in recent years has attempted to forge due
process standards relevant to the area of creditors' prejudgment
remedies." Unfortunately, the Court has failed to enunciate the
underlying bases of its decisions.49 It has relied on factual distinc-
tions rather than readily discernable standards that are applicable
and adaptable to the various creditors' remedies. Nevertheless, the
Court has supplied a basic due process framework.
Courts apply a two-step analysis when a prejudgment remedy is
constitutionally challenged. First, it must be determined whether
the statute violates the due process guarantee. The appropriate
standard is straightforward: whether by state action there has been
a deprivation of a significant property interest." In this context, the
typical property interest at stake is the owner's or possessor's inter-
est in the continued use and possession of his property.5 Further-
more, deprivation need only be temporary in order to invoke due
process protections.52 Once the requisite state action and "taking"
have been established, the second step of the analysis concerns the
procedural protections required by due process.0 Herein lies the
confusion. In Fuentes v. Sheyin,54 the Court seemed to establish
inflexible requirements of notice and opportunity for a prior hearing
before a state could authorize its agents to seize property in the
possession of a person upon the application of another. Two years
after it decided Fuentes, the Court in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. 5
upheld a Louisiana sequestration" statute which, in its effect upon
48. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
49. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 614 (1975) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
50. Note, Possessory Liens: The Need for Separate Due Process Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 971, 979 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Separate Due Process Analysis]; Comment,
Procedural Due Process and Oregon's New Possessory Lien Law, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 151, 155
(1975).
51. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972).
53. Separate Due Process Analysis, supra note 50, at 980.
54. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
55. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
56. The sequestration procedure allows a lien holder to obtain, upon ex parte application,
a writ of sequestration to forestall waste or alienage of the liened property. Upon issue of the
writ, the sheriff takes possession of the property in question and holds it pending litigation.
No notice is given, and hearing will only occur within 5 days after the seizure.
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the owner of property, was indistinguishable from the challenged
replevin statutes in Fuentes. Yet that statute did not provide for a
hearing before seizure. In Mitchell the Court gave greater considera-
tion to the nature of the creditor's interest than it had in Fuentes,
observing that the vendor's lien in Mitchell represented a current,
real interest in the property seized, whereas the creditors in Fuentes
had no present interest in the property." Therefore, the due process
examination entailed review of the interests of both debtor and
creditor. The Court did not clarify to which part of the two-step
analysis the creditor's interest pertained. Was it relevant to the
issue of whether a due process violation had occurred, or was it the
chief factor in determining the scope of the procedural safeguards
required? '" When the interests are balanced, according to one read-
ing of Mitchell, no due process protection of the debtor's interest
need take place." But this frustration of due process should yield
to a better interpretation of Mitchell, focusing on the procedures
mandated by due process to protect the constitutionally cognizable
property interests of both parties."
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,"1 the Court
seemed to endorse this approach. In assessing the constitutionality
of a Georgia garnishment statute, the Court compared the features
of that statute to the steps involved in the Louisiana sequestration
procedure. The saving features of the sequestration statute were:
the participation by a judge in the issuance of the writ of sequestra-
tion, the requirement of more than mere conclusory allegations in
filing the affidavit, and the requirement for a prompt post-seizure
hearing and dissolution of the writ if the creditor failed to prove his
grounds for sequestration. 2 While this last procedure appears to be
irreconcilable with the Fuentes holding, it must be understood that
under Louisiana law any transfer of possession of the chattel by the
debtor can defeat the creditor's vendor's lien." Thus, the peculiar
vulnerability of the creditor's interest was crucial to a determination
of the allowable procedural requirements.
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,64 though it ap-
pears to limit Mitchell to its facts, did not return fully to the notice
and prior hearing requirements of Fuentes. The unconstitutional
57. 416 U.S. at 604.
58. Separate Due Process Analysis, supra note 50, at 981 n.54.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
62. Id. at 606-07.
63. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3228 (West).
64. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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garnishment statute in Di- Chem failed because seizure of property
was carried out without notice or opportunity for an early hearing,
or other safeguard against mistaken repossession."8
One commentator has suggested that an effective way to reconcile
these decisions is to consider them as reference points along a con-
tinuum of due process procedural requirements.6 The procedures
required in Fuentes would represent the end of the continuum most
favorable to debtors' interests, whereas those in Mitchell would
cluster at the opposite pole, favoring creditors' interests. Di-Chem
would occupy a point in-between, closer to Fuentes because of its
factual similarity to that case. To use the continuum, one would
compare the interests in need of protection in a particular case to
those in the reference cases. From that, one could ascertain which
procedures would be appropriate. The Court's attention to specific
features of the challenged statutes in Mitchell and Di-Chem would
lend support to this interpretation. 7 Furthermore, a consideration
of the underlying purposes of the Court's entrance into the creditors'
remedies area clarifies its chosen course of action.
In Fuentes, the Court discussed why a hearing prior to seizure was
deemed essential to due process. The right to be heard guards the
use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachments and
discourages mistaken or unfair deprivations. 8 A preliminary deter-
mination of the probable validity of the creditor's claim supplies a
method for reducing the chance that seizure will unfairly infringe
upon the debtor's right to continued possession."5 In most cases a
hearing is the only procedure that gives this assurance. 0
However, in light of Mitchell and Di-Chem one could say that a
prior hearing is not mandated in every case. In Mitchell a prompt
post-seizure hearing was adequate, while in Di-Chem an early hear-
ing or similar safeguard would have been necessary.7 The purpose
of due process procedural requirements is to prevent mistaken or
unfair deprivations of property. Arguably, as long as a statute con-
tained sufficient safeguards to accomplish this purpose, then due
process would be satisfied. While a prior hearing is the best safe-
guard, it may not always be practical or possible to supply it. The
65. Id. at 606.
66. Separate Due Process Analysis, supra note 50, at 1002-03.
67. 419 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1975).
68. 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
69. Rendlernan, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 557 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Rendleman].
70. The Court in Fuentes stated that a "right to a prior hearing" is the only truly effective
safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of property. 407 U.S. at 83.
71. See notes 62 through 65 supra.
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expense and time may not be commercially reasonable; the creditor
has the increased risk of damage to the collateral; and the procedure
may overburden the courts. Moreover, some combination of other
procedures may accomplish the same results in certain cases-the
creditor might be required to establish to the satisfaction of a judi-
cial officer a factual basis for the need to seize possession, he might
be under a strict burden of proof to do so, and he might be penalized
if at a later date the seizure was found to be without merit.72
The Court has a second concern in restructuring debtor-creditor
relationships in prejudgment remedies: preventing private individu-
als from abusing the state seizure power.73 This consideration is
intertwined with the Court's desire to prevent unfair deprivations
of property. The state's ability to seize a person's property is one of
the most formidable expressions of its police power and one that
should be well controlled. Yet, in the challenged statutes private
individuals were able to put this machinery into operation without
having to meet any true tests as to the necessity for this action.
These broad statutes contained few provisions that would curb mis-
use of this police power.7" Therefore, due process requires effective
regulation of the state's seizure power.
DUE PROCESS EXAMINATION OF ILLINOIS LIEN STATUTES
Section 45 of Illinois' primary repairman's lien statute7 5 details
the procedures for foreclosure and sale of a liened chattel. Once the
lienor has filed his lien with the county clerk, he may move immedi-
ately for foreclosure by delivering a certified copy of the lien notice
with a signed foreclosure request endorsed thereon to the sheriff.
The lienor must also post a bond equal to twice the amount claimed.
The sheriff is then empowered to take the chattel into his posses-
72. These suggestions might be particularly appropriate in a situation in which uncompli-
cated, documentary proof of the claim is available. This analysis should be approached from
the viewpoint of the total effect of the procedures in preventing arbitrary deprivations of
property.
73. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972): "The [replevin] statutes moreover abdi-
cate effective state control over state power."
74. The Court in Fuentes criticized the challenged Florida and Pennsylvania replevin
statutes in this regard:
No state official participates in the decision to seek a writ; no state official reviews
the basis for the claim to repossession; and no state official evaluates the need for
immediate seizure. There is not even a requirement that the plaintiff provide any
information to the court on these matters. The State acts largely in the dark.
407 U.S. at 93. In Di-Chem, Inc., the same lack of controls existed. One seeking garnishment
was only required to make conclusory allegations concerning one's reason to apprehend loss
if garnishment did not issue before a clerk of the court. 419 U.S. at 607.
75. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 40-47 (1975).
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sion, as in cases of replevin. The sheriff must deliver a copy of the
lien notice and a certified, itemized bill of particulars to the posses-
sor of the chattel at the time of the taking, and mail a copy of the
notice to the owner or holder of a chattel mortgage.
The owner may at any time within 10 days of service deliver a
written and verified denial to the sheriff. He may also post a bond
equal to twice the amount of the lien in order to regain possession.
The owner must post bond when he serves the denial, or possession
will be retained by the sheriff until the foreclosure suit is decided.
If no denial is served within 10 days, then the sheriff advertises sale
of the chattel for 10 days and conducts a public sale.
Should the lienor neglect to commence a foreclosure suit within
10 days after service of denial, the chattel is returned to the owner.
Thus, unless owner posts bond, he will not be able to regain quick
possession of his chattel unless the lienor fails to commence a fore-
closure suit. Otherwise, he must wait until the suit has been adjudi-
cated.
Section 45 can be divided into a seizure provision and a sale
provision. The sale section need not be discussed in detail insofar
as it does provide for notice and a hearing before the state conducts
the sale. Under the two-step analysis a sale falls within the scope
of the due process guarantee. There is action by the state (a public
sale conducted by the sheriff) that constitutes a deprivation of a
significant property interest (owner is permanently and totally de-
prived of all property rights in the chattel). Applying the second
step of the analysis to determine the adequate procedural safe-
guards, one would place a sale provision on a continuum of proce-
dural requirements at the Fuentes position because the debtor's
need for protection is great."6 Therefore, the statute must provide for
notice and prior hearing in order to safeguard the totality of the
debtor's property rights against the extreme form of deprivation
represented by a sale. The sale portion of section 45 insures that the
owner is given notice of the foreclosure as well as opportunity to
respond to and deny the lienor's claim. At this point the onus rests
with the lienor to pursue his claim. The owner has the opportunity
to engage in a foreclosure suit before the chattel may be sold. Thus,
the sale portion of section 45 is constitutionally sufficient to protect
the debtor's rights, and would be able to withstand a due process
challenge.
76. Actually a sale is a more extreme measure than a temporary seizure, as in Fuentes,
and would therefore be placed along a continuum at a point beyond Fuentes, except that
notice and prior hearing appear to be the ultimate procedures mandated by due process.
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The seizure part of section 45 presents a more complex situation.
Again, the first step of the analysis is no obstacle. State action takes
the form of an officer exercising the police power to seize a chattel
in the possession of one individual at the instigation of another. The
property interest infringed is the "use" interest described by Justice
Harlan in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp." The ability of the
debtor to regain possession of his chattel by posting bond does not
nullify the deprivation. In Di-Chem, the Court reasoned that such
a provision merely substituted one form of property for another, and
therefore did not alter the character of the seizure as a deprivation
of a significant property interest. 8
In trying to determine due process requirements, one faces the
difficult question of where to place the seizure remedy along the
continuum of procedures. This section is markedly similar to the
replevin procedures in Fuentes. The lien notice contains only allega-
tions as to the existence and amount of the lien and the amount
unpaid. It is verified by oath of the claimant or someone having
personal knowledge of the facts. The notice and a certified, itemized
bill of particulars are served upon the owner at the time of the
seizure.7" In this respect the Illinois statute differs from the proce-
dures attacked in Fuentes, Di-Chem, and Sniadach in that the
lienor furnishes some documentary proof substantiating the validity
of his claim. But the distinction is slight. This proof does not appear
to be an essential element in setting the seizure machinery in mo-
tion, nor will failure to provide the sheriff with a copy necessarily
prevent a seizure.
While the indexing and filing of liens established by sections 41,
42, and 4480 may constitute constructive notice to the owner that a
claim has been filed against him, usually the lienor may file and
move for foreclosure in the same day. In that case, if it is determined
that the owner had adequate notice of the claim and possible sei-
zure, then notice becomes a concept without meaning. The owner
normally receives notice of the repairman's actions when the sheriff
takes possession of the chattel, but by then he is without recourse
to prevent the seizure. Thus, by allowing a lienor to invoke the
power of the state to seize another's property upon the mere verifica-
tion of a conclusory statement as to the lienor's entitlement, without
adequate prior notice, section 45 parallels the unconsitutional pro-
cedures in Fuentes.
77. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. 419 U.S. at 607-08.
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 45 (1975).
80. Id. at §§ 41, 42, 44.
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However, an important distinction between the situation in
Fuentes and repairmen's liens lies in the nature of the creditor's
interest. The repairman's lien for materials and services has a dual
nature. As a means of securing payment, it is a security device; but
it is a property interest by virtue of the labor expended and the
addition of goods to the chattel. The effect of the repairman's rights
upon due process analysis depends upon one's reading of Mitchell."'
As in that case, both the owner and the repairman have concurrent,
real interests in the chattel seized. If no due process protection need
occur when the creditor's and debtor's interests balance, then one
could argue by analogy that the repairman's rights offset the
owner's, thus precluding a finding of due process violation. The
seizure procedure would stand.
However, even this interpretation may turn on which aspect of
the repairman's lien a court chooses to emphasize, the security in-
terest or the property interest. In Mason v. Garris, 12 the court found
a repairman's lien to be merely a security interest, unlike the prop-
erty interest created by the conditional sales contract that had been
insufficient to prevent due process analysis in Fuentes. The court
reasoned that since one with a property interest in the goods could
not take them from the user without abiding by procedural due
process, a repairman with only a security interest would also need
to meet identical constitutional standards." This approach has the
drawback of ignoring the dual nature of the repairman's interest and
in this regard it is superficial.
The reading of Mitchell that permits a court to stop at the first
step of the due process analysis has another flaw. The purpose of
due process is not fulfilled simply because both the owner and the
repairman have current, real interests-namely, the owner's use
interest and the repairman's property interest. The basic question
is whether the creditor has unfairly or mistakenly deprived the
debtor of property. An analysis that fails to reach the procedural
circumstances of the taking cannot answer this fundamental due
process question. A court should go to the second step and inquire
into the probable validity of the creditor's claim before seizure oc-
curs. The extent of procedural protections should reflect the com-
parative weights of the opposing interests. Yet, even in situations
where the creditor stands in a more vulnerable position than the
debtor, lien statutes should require that a court insist upon certain
81. See notes 58 through 60 supra and accompanying text.
82. 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
83. Id. at 424.
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fundamental procedural safeguards aimed at regulating seizures.
One must recall that the sequestration statute in Mitchell passed
constitutional muster because of its saving procedural features.8'
Regardless of the intensity of the creditor's interest in the property,
his remedy should not entail abrogating procedural safeguards for
the debtor.
To incorporate this basic purpose, section 45 should provide for
notice and a hearing prior to any seizure by the state. The issues
raised by such seizures are indistinguishable from those in Fuentes,
and therefore it might be advisable to adopt the procedures ap-
proved in that decision.
The creditor's interest in Mitchell was totally unprotected, neces-
sitating procedures that allowed taking prior to judicial question-
ing.m The Illinois repairman is rarely in such a vulnerable position,
because his claim can only be defeated if the liened chattel is un-
available for sale.
In extreme cases the degree of protection afforded by the ap-
proved Mitchell procedures would suffice: nature of the claim shown
by more than conclusory allegations; participation by a judicial
officer; and prompt, post-seizure hearing entitling the owner to re-
gain possession unless the repairman shows cause why the chattel
should be held pending litigation. 6 The repairman would merit in-
creased protection in instances where he knows or has reason to
suspect that the chattel will be destroyed or unavailable for sale.8
Because the repairman's interest ordinarily does not require an
extraordinary degree of protection, Illinois lien statutes should pro-
vide for some form of notice to the owner and a preliminary hearing
into the necessity for seizure of the chattel. A court should deter-
mine at the outset whether the debtor ought to furnish security, and
if so, in what form. The foreclosure suit would determine the merits
of the claim.
Other procedures aimed at establishing validity and controlling
seizure machinery might protect the debtor's interest while provid-
ing flexibility for the creditor.m Emphasis upon documentation of
claims is one approach. To establish that a claim exists, the court
could inspect signed repair estimates, authorization forms, unpaid
bills, and requests for payment. However, this inspection would not
84. See note 61 supra.
85. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Rendleman, supra
note 69, at 583.
88. See notes 72, 80 and 81 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8
Repairmen's Liens
determine the validity of the claim in certain instances. For exam-
ple, a customer may have authorized a repair costing $300, but he
may not have received $300 worth of service (i.e., his car still does
not work correctly). In this case, the repairman's claim for $300
would still be invalid. Although these features would be useful in
one of the exceptional cases where a post-seizure hearing would be
allowed, they do not represent a substitute for a prior hearing in the
majority of cases.
A hearing prior to seizure is the most direct means of accomplish-
ing the Court's two purposes: preventing unfair or mistaken depri-
vations and restraining the states' seizure power. However, in the
absence of specific guidelines as to the proper procedures to be
applied to various factual situations, there is room for experimenta-
tion by the legislature to achieve a scheme that is both practical and
responsive to the interests of both parties.
State Action in Illinois Mechanic's Small Lien Act
Whereas the due process analysis of sections 40 through 47 re-
quired no consideration of the presence of state action, 9 the provi-
sions in sections 47a through 47f" must be examined to resolve this
threshold issue before any further analysis can occur. This statute
allows the repairman to retain possession of the chattel. If after 90
days following completion of labor the owner has not redeemed the
chattel, the repairman may extrajudicially sell the chattel at public
auction after publishing notice. Nowhere does the statute provide
for participation by a state office or officer. The actions are those of
a private individual. Nonetheless, they may yet be considered ac-
tions of the state for fourteenth amendment purposes if one or more
theories of state action apply to them.
Authorization and Encouragement Theory
Under this theory, when the state designs its statutes to allow
individuals to act in constitutionally forbidden ways, the sanctioned
activity is state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The case most often cited as support for this position is
Reitman v. Mulkey,9' which invalidated an amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution that, in effect, authorized private racial discrim-
ination. The Supreme Court held that the amendment significantly
involved the state in this forbidden discrimination.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, §§ 40-47 (1975). Because of the sheriffs involvement, state
action was clearly present.
90. Id. at §§ 47a-47f.
91. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
19771
Loyola University Law Journal
In the case of the repairman's lien, the state encourages the credi-
tor to act unconstitutionally by authorizing him to deprive the
owner of property without notice or opportunity for hearing. Courts
that have considered possessory repairman's liens like Illinois' have
divided on whether to accept the encouragement theory." This
theory received its most extreme extension in Cockerel v. Caldwell13
where the court stated that legislative embodiments of the public
will are considered actions of the state when the consequences of the
statute enable private citizens to act in derogation of the Constitu-
tion.
Courts that refuse to accept this theory in the context of creditors'
remedies advance a number of arguments against it. Since racial
discrimination is the particular target of the fourteenth amend-
ment, courts have stretched state action theories to their outermost
limits to reach the problems peculiar to race discrimination. How-
ever, they lack justification for expanding the theory to unrelated
areas. 4 A second argument states that the encouragement theory
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the state authorizes any-
thing it neglects to forbid, ultimately destroying the distinction be-
tween state action and private action.5 A third argument supports
the theory but finds that its emphasis should be on whether the
state compelled the individual to take this course of action. The
challenged activity must significantly implicate the state in more
than a neutral capacity5 -mere authorization will not suffice.
The Public Function Theory
A more persuasive theory, and one more applicable to possessory
repairmen's liens, is the public function theory of state action.
Under this theory, private action becomes the equivalent of state
action when the state delegates a duty it traditionally performs to
92. Courts that have accepted authorization and encouragement as a basis for state action
in repairman's liens are: Caeser v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Cockerel v.
Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974). See also Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F.
Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (innkeeper's lien). Those that have rejected it are: Phillips v.
Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974); Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 386 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
93. 378 F. Supp. 491, 494 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
94. Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago, 527 F.2d 150, 155-56 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976)(innkeeper's lien); Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 386 F. Supp.
1251, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and
Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003 (Parts I
and R) (1973); 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (Parts III and IV)(1973) [hereinafter cited as Burke and
Reber].
95. Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974).
96. Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan National Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 156 (1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 928 (1976). See also Burke and Reber, supra note 94, at 47.
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a private individual; normally in the case of a possessory lien, the
sheriff performs the function of detention and sale. Again, accept-
ance of this theory into the field of creditors' remedies has been
mixed. 7 Those factions of the judiciary which accept the doctrine
seem to take it at face value. The courts that reject this theory as a
basis of state action claim that it should be limited to the contexts
in which it arose, racial discrimination cases and cases involving the
first amendment." Others refuse to characterize the activity as one
traditionally or exclusively performed by the state, noting the com-
mon law origin of most possessory liens."
Given the courts' division over whether these theories of state
action should apply to creditors' remedies, it is wholly uncertain
whether Illinois' detention and sale provisions would be deemed
actions of the state. Two federal courts, when faced with a challenge
to Illinois' innkeeper's lien statute' ° came to divergent conclusions
as to the presence of state action. In Collins v. Viceroy Hotel
Corp.,'"' the district court relied on Reitman v. Mulkey'"° and the
authorization and encouragement theory to find state action in the
extrajudicial detention and sale of a guest's goods pursuant to the
Illinois innkeeper's lien. Because the statute provided neither notice
nor hearing prior to detention, nor hearing prior to sale, it was found
to be violative of due process. In Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Na-
tional Bank of Chicago, 13 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found insufficient state action under either the authoriza-
tion theory or the public function theory to warrant due process
scrutiny. The court rejected the authorization rationale because the
state's impact on private ordering was found to be minimal. It put
aside the public function theory because the state had not tradition-
ally asserted and enforced innkeeper's liens.
97. Caeser v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645, 647 (M.D.N.C. 1975) and Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d
845 (5th Cir. 1972) (landlord's lien) are two of the cases adopting this theory. Phillips v.
Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974) and Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chi-
cago, 527 F.2d 150 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976), have rejected it.
98. The racial discrimination cases which first employed the public function language
were the "white primary cases." Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). This theory has also been
developed in cases dealing with the first amendment: Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946).
99. Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago, 527 F.2d 150, 156 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 71, § 2(1975); Id. ch. 82, § 57 (1975).
101. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
102. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
103. 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
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The courts' treatment of this lien is important because of its
procedural similarities to the repairman's lien in section 47a: both
allow the lienor to retain possession of the liened chattels, wait for
redemption, then move to sell the items after notice has been pub-
lished and a copy mailed to the owner's residence. Neither provided
for any form of hearing. However, two distinctions limit the useful-
ness of the comparison for constitutional purposes. The innkeeper's
lien involves an actual invasion of the debtor's premises and a sei-
zure of his chattels, since possession is usually not given over to the
innkeeper when a guest enters the premises. This contrasts with the
repairman's ability to retain possession of a chattel that was origi-
nally surrendered voluntarily to him. Furthermore, the innkeeper's
interest in the chattels is general in that any one or all of the
debtor's effects may be used to satisfy the lien. The repairman's
interest in the liened chattel is specific, and has the quality of being
a property interest as well as a security interest.
These distinctions combine to make the innkeeper's lien more
injurious to the debtor's interest and more constitutionally suspect.
While these distinguishing features might dispose a court to find
state action more readily with innkeeper's liens than repairmen's
liens, they do not necessarily constitute a valid basis for refusing to
acknowledge state action in the operation of possessory repairmen's
liens. For reasons already discussed, 04 the repairman's lien is suffi-
ciently threatening to the debtor's interest to warrant due process
scrutiny.
Of the two theories, the public function theory would be the more
likely basis for establishing state action in Illinois' sections 47a
through 47f. The theory stresses the extent of the possessory and
removal powers which the state or its private delegate may wield.
If the state chooses to empower an individual to resolve a commer-
cial dispute for the sake of convenience or economy, the state should
limit this authority by applying the same restraints that it imposes
upon itself. This argument has persuasive force when the state is
delegating a major power. The sale provision qualifies as such be-
cause it enables an individual to extinguish permanently and totally
another's property rights in a chattel. Thus, not only from a consti-
tutional perspective, but from a practical one as well, there should
be some statutory control along with delegation to prevent abuse of
this power.
If, under either approach, state action is found in sections 47a
through 47f, then the sale provision would clearly fail to meet due
104. See notes 76 through 88 supra and accompanying text.
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process standards under the same analysis applied to section 45.105
The detention provision presents a different question because,
strictly speaking, there is no seizure of goods involved. The issue is
whether the ability to retain possession of a voluntarily surrendered
chattel is a deprivation for due process purposes.
Though few courts have considered the question, the weight of
authority supports the position that retention of possession by the
repairman is not a constitutional deprivation.'"6 The majority cite
the voluntary nature of the owner's original surrender of possession
as the crucial factor. 07 A deprivation is fair if the owner has volun-
tarily given up possession. And unlike most state seizures, the ele-
ments of surprise or arbitrariness are not present. The majority
mentions the repairman's property interest as a second factor which
prevents a finding of unfair deprivation. 0 8 In so doing, these courts
stop at the first step of the due process analysis.
These arguments are susceptible to criticism. The Supreme
Court's language relating to deprivation of "use" interests was not
limited to seizures. A deprivation may result from refusal to permit
the owner to repossess the chattel as surely as it may when one
removes the chattel from the owner's control. The unfairness occurs,
not when the owner gives the chattel to the repairman, but when
the repairman refuses to give it back. In essence, the repairman
declares the validity of his claim and thereby places the burden on
the owner to prove otherwise. And until the owner meets this bur-
den, it is the repairman who retains possession. Thus, the state
bestows a remedy upon the repairman, yet fails to exact its
due-proof of the claim.
The Supreme Court has raised the debtor's interest in continued
use and possession of property to a constitutionally significant level.
By refusing to consider the repairman's detention as a deprivation,
some courts have ignored the debtor's interest and circumvented the
Court's purposes.
If detention by the repairman is constitutionally permissible ei-
ther because it is not state action or a deprivation, then the legisla-
ture might wish to avoid the necessity for two hearings in the section
105. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
106. Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F.
Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520
P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974); Comment, Procedural Due Process and Oregon's New
Possessory Lien Law, 12 WiLAMETrE L.J. 151 (1975).
107. Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974).
108. Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645, 648-49 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378
F. Supp. 491, 498 (W.D. Ky. 1974).
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40109 statute by eliminating the seizure provision in section 45 and
making the lien possessory. If this were the case, there would be two
possessory repairmen's liens, both requiring notice and hearing prior
to sale of the chattel, the only distinction then being the amount of
the claim. Such repetition would be unnecessary. Even if sections
40 through 47 are not amended, the requirement of a hearing prior
to sale in section 47c would add to the expense of enforcing that lien.
The utility of a separate statutory lien would be questionable in any
event, given this impairment of its purpose to provide a quick and
inexpensive method for enforcing small claims.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois legislature should address the problems attending
the priority of subsequent repairmen's liens over perfected security
interests. Though the major lien statute provides a realistic and
practical accommodation of interests, UCC 9-310 allows the com-
mon law possessory lien to work an anomalous result. Furthermore,
the Mechanic's Small Lien Act gives the lienor priority if his claim
is under $200. The legislature should either formulate a uniform
policy of priority or justify the results obtained under 9-310.
The common law lien circumvents the expressed intent of the
legislature to grant preference to prior security interests. Further-
more, the repairman's retention of possession invites abuse of the
system. Indeed, the Supreme Court has looked askance at interfer-
ence with the owner's right to continued possession and use of his
chattel. The legislature should reconsider whether possession by
itself actually represents a valid basis for establishing a repairman's
lien.
The Court has also devoted considerable attention to the consti-
tutionality of various prejudgment remedies of creditors. Though
the Court has not addressed repairmen's lien statutes specifically,
it has established the constitutional significance of the debtor's in-
terest in continued use and possession of his property. The burden
of creating a procedural scheme that adequately protects the
debtor's interest from arbitrary or mistaken infringement rests with
the legislature. Concurrently, it must restrain unfettered use of the
state's police power.
The seizure and sale provisions in section 45 of the major Illinois
lien statute demand revision. Notice and hearing before sale appear
to be the only procedures that can adequately protect the debtor's
109. See notes 76 and 85 supra and accompanying text.
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rights. Moreover, it is quite probable that notice and hearing are
constitutionally mandated before any seizure of the chattel by the
state.
The Mechanic's Small Lien Act may withstand a due process
analysis. However, one or more theories of state action might render
the sale provision constitutionally infirm. In that event, the sale
provision would also require notice and a prior hearing. The deten-
tion section of the Mechanic's Small Lien Act could remain un-
changed if retained possession were not held to constitute an unfair
deprivation. However, a close reading of the Supreme Court's recent
expostulations could lead one to conclude that a detention is as
violative of due process as a seizure.
Unless the legislature can justify the separate existence of the
Mechanic's Small Lien Act, it should subsume the Act into a single
lien statute, simply by revising sections 40 through 47. It should be
non-possessory and incorporate certain fundamental procedures: fil-
ing of lien, notice of claim, preliminary hearing to determine the
propriety of seizure of the chattel or posting other security, and
lastly, a foreclosure suit on the merits. The revised statute should
identify situations requiring extraordinary protection of the credi-
tor's interests and should provide for appropriate relief in such ex-
ceptional circumstances.
JULIE L. ROPER
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